Giora Eiland on the Palestinian Perspective

In an important op-ed in Yediot Ahronoth, Giora Eiland analyses the current Palestinian perspective. Looking at the last few years, Eiland notes a shift in pre-conditions.  

Ostensibly, the Palestinians are receiving the maximum that can be obtained before negotiations. In this sense, their achievement is impressive. From 2001 to 2007, they demanded to reach just such a situation, and Israel was the one that refused. Israel demanded the fulfillment of preconditions, mainly based on the road map, according to which the Palestinians had to prove that they were suppressing terror, then they would have a state with provisional borders, and only then would they be "worthy" of discussing the final status arrangement. The willingness of Olmert and Livni to start the Annapolis process in 2007 was perceived as a great Israeli concession and a Palestinian achievement. Why, then, are the Palestinians not currently interested in accepting Netanyahu's extended hand?

In essence, the Palestinians think once the negotiations actually get under way they will have great difficulty reaching an agreement with Netanyahu and that they, according to Eiland “do not believe that it is possible to reach a final status arrangement through direct negotiations with Israel, no matter who the prime minister is.” So, from the Palestinian point of view, “only a plan presented by the US president himself, a concrete and detailed plan, would make Israel ‘take things seriously.’”

Looking at the potential details of a hypothetical Obama plan, Eiland identifies 3 key elements:

Firstly, in terms of content, the plan would be more pro-Palestinian than Clinton's plan. Secondly, Clinton was at the end of his path, and Obama is at the start of his, and bears the commitment of a Nobel Peace Prize to reach achievements and quickly. Thirdly, Obama will not settle for an American initiative, but will want to rally international support around it. 

In many ways, this theoretical plan will provide support and cover for the Palestinian Authority since:

It will relieve them of the need to compromise in negotiations with Israel, and to risk condemnation by Hamas and other Arab parties. They will prefer to take Obama's plan and bring it before the Arab League for approval. After they receive overwhelming support, they will be able to enjoy greater political confidence.

This raises the question of Israel’s potential response. From Eiland’s viewpoint:

The decision on a construction freeze gives Netanyahu a certain breathing space against immediate American pressure. This should be used to convey two messages to the US administration: Firstly, after we have agreed on a formula to solve the small problem (freezing the settlements), we can now deal with solving the large problem (direct negotiations on the final status arrangement). Secondly, a forced American plan is dangerous, not only to the government in Israel but also to the American reputation. Clinton's failure at the end of his term was not pleasant, but also not terrible. An initiative of a president at the start of his path, which has high chances of failure, will have negative ramifications for his ability to lead initiatives until the end of his term.