Interview with Dr. Kam: "The Supreme Leader Is Khamenei And His Candidate Was Ahmadinejad"

Earlier today, The Pulse interviewed Ephraim Kam, Deputy Head of the Institute for National Security Studies. A former Colonel in the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence, Dr. Kam specializes in security problems of the Middle East, strategic intelligence, and Israel's national security issues.

Pulse: Were you surprised by the results of the Iranian elections?

Kam: There was no surprise in the election victory of Ahmadinejad.  The surprise was in the far-reaching majority he received in the first round. Most assessments were that he would win because he had advantages over his opponents, specifically he is quite popular among the poor and in the rural villages and he had the support of the spiritual leader, the Revolutionary Guards, as well as religious organizations. However, there is some basis to suspect that the results were distorted because his victory is too overwhelming.

Pulse: What does this mean to Iranian policy?

Kam: This election gives Ahmadinejad a new mandate to continue his old policy.  There are no changes expected in his internal or external policies. Nor were any changes expected even before the election results because the real political power is in the hands of the spiritual leader Khamenei, not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

I do not expect change on the nuclear issue because this issue was not even an element in the campaign. The continuation of the nuclear program was supported by all candidates. Clearly these last two days have brought disappointment to the US Administration which had expected a more moderate leader to come to power, one that would be more helpful to the American-Iranian dialogue. Instead, we have Ahmadinejad who will continue with the same belligerent style that he has until now. This is not good news for the Americans. 

Pulse: Will there be any change vis-à-vis Israel?

Kam: No, again, we can expect the same anti-Semitic, anti-Israel style of Ahmadinejad to continue.  There is some reason to view his victory as better for Israel because Ahmadinejad's views and policies are black and white; no one will have to be convinced that he is the bad guy. But remember, that even if Moussavi had been elected there would not have been a significant change in his policy vis-à-vis Israel.  So, as I say, in some ways we are better off with Ahmadinejad.

Pulse: What does this mean to the opposition forces?

Kam: Had Moussavi been elected there would have been changes on the domestic level, perhaps more freedom for the people. Now they will feel frustration and there will be disappointment in his camp.  The demonstrations and violence that we see reflect this, but the regime has an impressive capability to suppress such activity and I expect that it will end in a few days or weeks.

Pulse: But can you perceive any crack in the system, any gains by the more moderate forces?

Kam: There is hope for change in Iran, but it will take longer than we thought because these elections turned out not to be the beginning of that change; and, the next opportunity for change is a long way off.  We must not forget that the supreme leader is Khamenei and his candidate was Ahmadinejad.  Not only is Khamenei not swayed by the anti-Ahmadinejad enthusiasts, but his support of Ahmadinejad cemented the election results.

Deputy Head of the Institute for National Security Studies, Ephraim Kam served as a Colonel in the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence until 1993, when he joined the Jaffee Center. Positions he held in the IDF included assistant director of the Research Division for Evaluation and senior instructor at the IDF's National Defense College. He specializes in security problems of the Middle East, strategic intelligence, and Israel's national security issues. His book Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective was published by Harvard University Press and was awarded the 1988 prize for best book on intelligence matters from the National Intelligence Study Center, Washington, D.C. He is also the author of From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat (2004) and A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done (2007).