US-Iran Negotiations: Simulation Exercise at INSS

Ephraim Asculai, Emily B. Landau, and Tamar Malz-Ginzburg

INSS Insight No. 154, December 29, 2009

Despite the tendency to denote any simulation exercise on security issues a "war game," the recent simulation designed and held at INSS did not focus on the option of a military attack. Rather, it developed the scenario of a bilateral US-Iranian negotiation over Iran's nuclear program. [1] With Barack Obama – in line with his self-imposed end of the year deadline – currently poised to assess the progress made with his diplomatic outreach to Iran, the importance of understanding the implications of a possible direct bilateral dynamic comes into sharper focus.

The purpose of this exercise was to estimate the trends of a possible US-Iranian negotiation dynamic in order to evaluate the best response policy for Israel. Taking part were current and former senior personnel from the Israeli defense establishment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the academic world, including experts from INSS. The three main teams that took part in the exercise simulated the US, Iran, and Israel. The American and Iranian teams were further divided into upfront negotiations teams and behind-the-scenes "decision makers." Joining them was a large group of additional players representing Europe, Russia, China, the GCC, Egypt, and the IAEA.

The opening scenario created the conditions for the onset of a bilateral US-Iranian negotiation sparked by the nuclear crisis, but which would include a broader set of issues that went beyond the nuclear issue per se.

As the exercise developed, however, it became clear that the participants limited the declared general scope of the game, and became fixated on the situation as it was in early November. As such, the proposed Vienna Agreement on the supply of fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor took center stage in discussions. This persisted in spite of attempts by game coordinators to expand the talks to the more general issues, including the suspension of enrichment in Iran.

At a later stage in the exercise, an explosion was reported at the Arak heavy water production plant in Iran, and although whether this was an operational accident or deliberate sabotage was undetermined, the Iranian team turned the incident to its advantage by claiming Israeli aggression against Iran.

Although the event was a simulation exercise only, some important insights into the real world emerged.

Regarding Iran, its main strength is that it has a clearly defined ultimate aim: obtaining nuclear weapons capability. This aim guides its tactics in confronting the international community. In contrast, while in general terms the US as well as Israel wants to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear state, it lacks well-defined aims and consolidated strategies for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. What we observed is that this situation played to Iran's advantage, allowing it to determine to a large degree the pace and even the content of the talks. It used tactics of playing for time and flooding the US with vast amounts of irrelevant information to delay substantive discussion. Iran was also minded to form international coalitions and acquire allies, and demonstrated much flexibility to changing situations.

The Iranians felt superior and displayed this edge towards the Americans in the negotiations game. The US in general and President Obama in particular was perceived as weak. The Iranians estimated that because of internal and international considerations Obama would not dare launch a military attack on Iran's nuclear installations. Nor in their view did Israel pose a real threat. And overall, it was emphasized through the Iranian team in the simulation that Iran saw no way that it could be forced to suspend its ongoing uranium enrichment project unless the regime itself was put in danger. In this context, it was apparent that a military attack on Iran that is not preceded by an intensive campaign to sway world public opinion could cause severe harm to Israel and/or to the US, immunize Iran against further attacks, and generally strengthen Tehran's position.

For its part, the US, rather than taking the lead in the talks, was relegated to reacting to Iran's actions and positions. Following US responses both to Iran and to the increasing European and Israeli demands that they be partners in the negotiations decisions, it became clear that while Obama may be the dominant figure in the conflict with Iran, he appears neither able nor willing to take major decisions on this issue.

As in the case of the US, Israel did not display a clear definition of its ultimate aims regarding Iran, which could range from the dismantlement of the nuclear program to a change of regime. Consequently, there was no clear definition of how to attain its goals. Sensing its isolation from the world's actions towards Iran, Israel devoted much attention to influencing the US position, while making little effort to advance diplomatic moves with other potential partners, in Europe and in the region. This persisted despite its understanding of the US administration's limitations in negotiating with Iran, and can be attributed to Israel's own difficulties in creating and utilizing diplomatic opportunities. Israel became a perceptible burden on the US in the sense that its threats of military action demanded that the US devote energy to neutralize this possibility. Conversely, the lack of credibility of these threats in US eyes meant they could not be used by the US as a possible "stick" in its negotiations with Iran.

Returning from the exercise to the real world, the West remains entrenched in its efforts to obtain Iran's agreement to the Vienna proposal, Iran is becoming more adamant in its refusal while apparently still seeking a compromise solution, and more severe sanctions are yet to be seen. Meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear program proceeds relentlessly. The Vienna Agreement, even if implemented (and this is a very big if), will do nothing to slow down the enrichment process and obstruct the inevitability of Iran's nuclear weapons capability.

Where does this leave Obama? This is the big question on the eve of 2010. If he is serious about negotiations with Iran, he must improve his negotiations strategy. At the same time, perhaps he is simply not serious enough about arriving at a negotiated outcome. It is up to Israeli decision makers to assess which alternative is most likely, and on that basis develop Israel's own approach.

[1] We are grateful to NEST Consulting-Negotiations Strategies for its collaboration on the exercise, carried out on November 1, 2009.

This column is re-published with the permission of the Institute for National Security Studies.